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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: A TRAGIC VIEW
John D. Arras, Ph.D.*
I. PROLOGUE-A REFLECTION ON THE CAREER OF JOHN FLETCHER
Throughout his long and distinguished career, John Fletcher has made
major contributions to our public life in a wide variety of important policy
debates. He has pursued his vision of a just and decent society with unre-
mitting dedication to both the worthy goal of medical progress and to the
moral rights of all human beings. His contributions to our ongoing strug-
gles with the problems of biomedical research and reproductive technolo-
gies reflect not only an extraordinarily keen intellect, but also a host of
moral virtues, not the least of which is a remarkable capacity to be led not
by well-worn habit and bias, but rather by the power of evidence and
argument. In rather stark contrast to a number of well-known scholars
who have stuck to their ideologically driven positions well after the latter
have been thoroughly discredited by critics, John Fletcher has had the
courage and good sense to reverse his thinking and redirect his conclu-
sions whenever he thought the arguments demanded it.
Perhaps nowhere is this capacity to rethink a well-entrenched position
more evident than in John Fletcher's long-standing reflections on the dif-
ficult problem of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide ("PAS"). Fif-
teen years ago, Fletcher led a new generation of critics who opposed
these practices not on the narrow religious rationale that all such killing is
inherently immoral, but rather on the basis of a thoroughly secular, con-
sequentialist analysis of the likely bad effects of implementing the prac-
tices as a matter of social policy. In an influential essay published in 1982,
he argued that allowing a policy of euthanasia would result both in prob-
able harms to innocent parties-the poor, the psychologically disturbed,
the vulnerable elderly-and in a loss of opportunity for achieving positive
goods.
* Porterfield Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Professor of Philosophy University
of Virginia. The author would like to thank Yale Kamisar, Tom Murray, and Bonnie
Steinbock for helpful discussions and exchanges on the issues dealt with in this paper.
1. See John Fletcher, Is Euthanasia Ever Justifiable?, in CONTROVERSIES IN ONCOL-
OGY 297 (Peter H. Wiernik ed., 1982).
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Fletcher added a novel twist to an already voluminous literature by
contending that allowing terminal patients to opt for an easy death would
subvert current medical progress in pain management, gerontology, and
the care of the dying.2 He suggested that once society removes the moral
and legal barriers to killing terminally ill patients, the incentives for im-
proving their conditions, which mainly derive from the existence of such
barriers, will lose much of their force. Thus, while at that time Fletcher
admitted the moral licitness of certain individual acts of "mercy killing"
and what we today would call PAS, he argued strongly against establish-
ing a social policy on the basis of such exceptional cases. The likely social
risks and foregone humanitarian progress, he urged, would simply be too
great.
In recent years, however, John Fletcher and the rest of society have
been forced to reassess our positions in light of a reinvigorated social
movement in favor of PAS and euthanasia. Confronted by widespread
and largely unnecessary human suffering attendant upon the way we now
die, by the insistent claims of individual autonomy, and by the example of
compassionate and courageous physicians, Fletcher has abandoned his
earlier opposition and embraced a highly qualified proposal to legalize
and regulate these contested practices.3 He now argues that suffering can
be ended, and autonomy honored, without unduly endangering the social
fabric or the prospects for much-needed reforms in the care of the dying.
While I regard his position on this matter to be the result of much soul
searching and sober reflection, I strongly disagree with Fletcher regarding
the social logic of attempting to regulate PAS. Instead of merely heaping
additional praise upon John Fletcher, I offer him something more in spirit
of his remarkable life and career, a counter-argument, that I hope will
lead him to change his mind yet again.
II. INTRODUCTION
For many decades now, the call for PAS and euthanasia have been per-
ennial lost causes in American society. Each generation has thrown up
an assortment of earnest reformers and cranks who, after attracting their
fifteen minutes of fame, inevitably have been defeated by the combined
weight of traditional law and morality. Incredibly, two recent Federal ap-
pellate court decisions have suddenly changed the precedented landscape
2. Id.
3. See Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 119 (1994).
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in this area, making the various states within their respective jurisdictions
the first governments in world history, excepting perhaps the Nazi regime
in Germany, to officially sanction PAS. Within the space of a month,
both an eight to three majority of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit,' on the West Coast, and a three judge panel in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,5 in the Northeast,
struck down long-standing state laws forbidding physicians to aid or abet
their patients in acts of suicide. Within a virtual blink of an eye, a seem-
ingly unshakable consensus within the medical profession, the judiciary,
the bioethics community, and the general public had been unceremoni-
ously overturned.
Judge Reinhardt, writing for a majority of an en banc decision of the
Ninth Circuit,6 held that competent, terminally ill patients have a power-
ful "liberty interest," what used to be called a Constitutional right, to
enlist the aid of their physician in hastening death via prescriptions for
lethal drugs.7 He argued that just as the right to privacy guarantees wo-
men the right to choose an abortion, this liberty interest protects a right
to choose the time and manner of one's death.8
In response to warnings against the expansion of this right to broader
categories of patients (e.g., to the mentally incapacitated) and against the
great likelihood of mistake and abuse, Judge Reinhardt permitted the
regulation of PAS in order to avoid such evils; however, he pointedly
ruled out any and all blanket prohibitions.9 In response to the traditional
objections that allowing PAS would subvert the state's interests in
preventing suicide and maintaining the integrity of the medical profes-
sion, Judge Reinhardt contended that our society already has effectively
erased the distinction between merely allowing patients to die and killing
them.' ° Reinhardt claimed that by allowing patients or their surrogates
to forgo life-sustaining medical treatments, including artificially adminis-
tered nutrition and hydration, and by sanctioning the administration of
pain-killing drugs that might also hasten death, our society already per-
mits a variety of "death inducing" practices. Thus, the social risks of al-
4. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir. 1996).
5. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2nd Cir. 1996).
6. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 790.
7. Id. at 816.
8. Id. at 813-14.
9. Id. at 816-32, 836-37 (reviewing state interests and illustrating the application of
the balancing test and holding).
10. Id. at 822-23.
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lowing PAS are only different in degree, not in kind, from risks that we
already countenance.
Writing for the Second Circuit in striking down a similar New York
statute, Judge Miner explicitly rejected the claim of the Second Circuit
majority that a "substantive due process" right of PAS exists in the Con-
stitution. He conceded that the Supreme Court is unlikely to extend the
boundaries of the so-called right to privacy, but found nevertheless that
the statute violated the equal protection' clause of the Constitution.11
Echoing Judge Reinhardt's assertion that only a difference of degree sep-
arates PAS from the foregoing of life-sustaining treatments-claiming in
effect that the administration of potentially death hastening analgesics
constitutes a kind of suicide-Judge Miner observed that New York's
law1" allowed some people relief from the ravages of terminal illness (i.e.,
those connected to some form of removable life-support) while denying
relief to those not so connected, for whom PAS was the only remaining
exit. Concurring with Judge Reinhardt that the social risks of PAS are
identical to those of our more socially approved "death inducing" prac-
tices, Judge Miner concluded that this kind of differential treatment
serves no legitimate state purpose. Thus, he held that the law was uncon-
stitutional even in the absence of a new fundamental right to PAS. 13
What to think of these startling decisions? Are they harbingers of A
new world brave enough to overcome centuries of religious censure and
fear-mongering, a world that will no longer permit human beings to suffer
unwillingly the torments of terminal illness? Or are they dangerous aber-
rations, decisions that simultaneously affirm the autonomy of some, while
endangering the lives of society's most vulnerable citizens? While I find
myself to be deeply sympathetic to the central values motivating the push
for PAS and euthanasia, this Article shall argue that these practices pose
too great a threat to be legalized.
Central to the argument will be the claim that these decisions employ a
form of case-based reasoning that is ill-suited to the development of
sound social policy in this area. This Article shall argue that in order to
do justice to the very real threats posed by the practices of PAS and eu-
thanasia, we need to adopt precisely the kind of policy perspective that
the courts reject on principle. Thus, this Article presents an argument for
a forward-looking, legislative approach to PAS and euthanasia, as op-
11. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724-25 (2nd Cir. 1996).
12. Id. at 727-29.
13. Id. at 727.
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posed to an essentially backward-looking, judicial or constitutional
approach.'
4
This Article develops this argument in sequential steps. First, it briefly
identifies the central concerns and values of the pro-PAS/euthanasia posi-
tion, and then attempts to articulate the variety of serious and predictable
social risks attendant upon these practices, risks that take the form of two
distinct "slippery slopes." Having thus exhibited the cases pro and contra
PAS/euthanasia, this Article lays out the various "policy options" or ways
of thinking about these disputed practices. It shall be argued that the
judicial approach is blind to some very serious potential social dangers
and that, in its enthusiasm for liberty interests and equal protection, it
may actually end up prohibiting precisely the kinds of social checks that
we need to curtail these dangers. On the other hand, this Article also
argues that the specific legislative proposal made by John Fletcher and
colleagues goes a long way towards mollifying the fears of critics like me,
but that in the end it also represents too great a social risk at this time.
The Article concludes with a plea to maintain the legal status quo, i.e., a
regime that does not legally sanction PAS and euthanasia, but neverthe-
less covertly permits some particularly compassionate and courageous
physicians to violate the law in fear and trembling. At the same time, the
Article calls for a total revolution in the medical status quo governing the
delivery, of palliative care, the treatment of clinical depression, and the
care for the dying.
III. ARGUMENTS AND MOTIVATIONS IN FAVOR OF PAS/EUTHANASIA
The philosophical case for PAS and euthanasia consists of two distinct
prongs, both of which speak simply, directly, and powerfully to our com-
monsensical intuitions. First, there is the claim of autonomy, that all of us.
possess a right to self-determination in matters profoundly touching on
such religious themes as life, death, and the meaning of suffering. Just as
we should each be free to make important choices bearing on how we
shall live our own lives, so we should be equally free in choosing the time
and manner of our deaths. For some, more life will always be welcome as
a gift or perhaps even as a test of faith, but for others, continued life
signifies only disfiguring suffering and the unrelenting loss of everything
14. My stance on these issues has been profoundly influenced by my recent participa-
tion in the efforts of the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law (hereinafter New
York Task Force) to come to grips with this issue. Following a painstaking review of the
moral, legal, and social arguments, this highly pluralistic advisory committee unanimously
concluded against the legalization of either PAS or direct killing by physicians.
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that invested their lives with meaning and dignity. As philosopher Ron-
ald Dworkin has eloquently argued, it is a form of tyranny to force some-
one to endure unendurable suffering at the end of life merely for the sake
of someone else's values.' 5 Each of us should be free to live or die as we
see fit according to our own conceptions of the meaning of life and death.
Second, PAS and/or euthanasia are merciful acts that deliver terminally
ill patients from painful and protracted death. According to the utilita-
rian, acts are morally right insofar as they promote happiness and allevi-
ate unhappiness, and wrong insofar as they cause or allow others to suffer
needlessly. Even according to the traditional ethic of the medical profes-
sion, physicians have a solemn duty not merely to extend life whenever
possible (and desirable), but also to alleviate pain and suffering whenever
possible. For patients suffering from the final ravages of end-stage AIDS
or cancer, a doctor's lethal prescription or injection can be, and often is,
welcomed as a blessed relief. Accordingly, we should treat human beings
at least as well as we treat grievously ill or injured animals by putting
them, at their own request, out of their misery.
These philosophical reflections can be supplemented with a more
clinical perspective addressed to the motivational factors lying behind
many requests to die. Many people advocate legalization because they
fear a loss of control at the end of life. They fear falling victim to the
technological imperative; they fear dying in chronic and uncontrolled
pain; they fear the psychological suffering attendant upon the relentless
disintegration of the self; they fear, in short, a bad death. All of these
fears, it so happens, are eminently justified. Physicians routinely ignore
the documented wishes of patients and all-too-often allow patients to die
with uncontrolled pain.' 6 Studies of cancer patients have shown that over
fifty percent suffer from unrelieved pain, 7 and many researchers have
found that uncontrolled pain, particularly when accompanied by feelings
of hopelessness and untreated depression, is a significant contributing
factor for suicide and suicidal ideation.18
Clinical depression is another major factor influencing patients' choice
15. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, Eu-
THANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 217 (1993).
16. A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The
Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments
(SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591, 1591-92 (Nov. 22, 1995).
17. New York Task Force, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in
the Medical Context, x-xi (May 1994).
18. Id. at xiv.
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of suicide. 19 Depression, accompanied by feelings of hopelessness, is the
strongest predictor of suicide for both individuals who are terminally ill
and those who are not.20 Yet most doctors are not trained to notice de-
pression, especially in complex cases such as the elderly suffering from
terminal illnesses. Even when doctors succeed in diagnosing depression,
they often do not successfully treat it with readily available medications
in sufficient amounts.2 '
Significantly, the New York Task Force found that the vast majority of
patients who request PAS or euthanasia are capable of being treated suc-
cessfully both for their depression and their pain, and that when they re-
ceive adequate psychiatric and palliative care, their requests to die
usually are withdrawn.22 In other words, patients given the requisite con-
trol over their lives and relief from depression and pain usually lose inter-
est in PAS and euthanasia.23
With all due respect for the power of modern methods of pain control,
it must be acknowledged that a small percentage of patients suffer from
conditions, both physical and psychological, that currently lie beyond the
reach of the best medical and humane care. Some pain cannot be allevi-
ated short of inducing a permanent state of unconsciousness in the pa-
tient, and some depression is unconquerable. For such unfortunate
patients, the present law on PAS/euthanasia can represent an insuperable
barrier to a dignified and decent death.
IV. OBJECrIONS TO PAS/EUTHANASIA
Opponents of PAS and euthanasia can be grouped into three main fac-
tions. One strongly condemns both practices as inherently immoral, as
19. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes and
Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347 LANCET 1805 (1996).
See also D. Saltzburg et al., The Relationship of Pain and Depression to Suicidal Ideation in
Cancer Patients, 8 PROC. Asco 312 (1989) (abstract).
20. W. Breibart, Cancer Pain and Suicide, in 16 ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND
THERAPY 399-412 (K.M. Foley ed., 1990) (showing that studies indicate that depression "is
present in 50% of all suicides, and those suffering from depression are at 25 times greater
risk for suicide than the general population").
21. New York Task Force, supra note 17, at 127-28 (documenting the claim that doc-
tors fail to diagnose and treat depression). See also Y. Conwell & E.D. Caine, Rational
Suicide and the Right to Die, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1101 (1991).
22. New York Task Force, supra note 17, at xiv.
23. As we shall see later, this fact is of enormous importance for our evaluation of PAS
and euthanasia as social policies, for if the root causes or motivations for assisted death can
be addressed successfully for most patients through the delivery of technically competent
and compassionate medicine, the case for changing the law loses much of its urgency.
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violations of the moral rule against killing the innocent. Most members
of this group tend to harbor distinctly religious objections to suicide and
euthanasia, viewing them as violations of God's dominion over human
life.24 They argue that killing is simply wrong in itself, whether or not it is
done out of respect for the patient's autonomy or out of concern for her
suffering. Whether or not this position ultimately is justifiable from a
theological point of view, its imposition on believers and non-believers
alike is incompatible with the basic premises of a secular, pluralistic polit-
ical order.
A second faction primarily objects to the fact that physicians are being
called upon to do the killing. While conceding that killing the terminally
ill or assisting in their suicides might not always be morally wrong for
others to do, this group maintains that the participation of physicians in
such practices undermines their role as healers and fatally compromises
the physician-patient relationship.25
Finally, a third faction 6 readily grants that neither PAS nor active eu-
thanasia, practiced by ordinary citizens or by physicians, are always mor-
ally wrong. On the contrary, this faction believes that in certain rare
instances early release from a painful or intolerably degrading existence
might constitute both a positive good and an important exercise of per-
sonal autonomy for the individual. Indeed, many members of this faction
concede that should such a terrible fate befall them, they would hope to
find a thoughtful, compassionate, and courageous physician to release
them from their misery. But in spite of these important concessions, the
members of this faction shrink from endorsing or regulating PAS and ac-
tive euthanasia due to fears bearing on the social consequences of liberal-
ization. This view is based on two distinct kinds of so-called "slippery
slope" arguments: one bears on the inability to cabin PAS/euthanasia
within the confines envisioned by its proponents, the other focuses on the
likelihood of abuse, neglect, and mistake.
24. For religious objections to suicide and euthanasia, see St. Thomas Aquinas,
Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Oneself, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 119-21
(Tom L. Beauchamp & Robert M. Veatch eds., 2d ed. 1996). See also DWORKIN, supra
note 15, at 193. See also RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE RETURN OF EUGENICS: COMMEN-
TARY 22 (1988) (arguing that life is a good of the person, not simply for the person).
25. Willard Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill, 259 JAMA 2139, 2139-40 (1988). See
also David Orentlicher, Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide, 262 JAMA 1844, 1844-
45 (1989).
26. The author was a part of this faction during his tenure with the New York Task
Force.
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A. An Option Without Limits
The first version of the slippery slope argument contends that a socially
sanctioned practice of PAS would in all likelihood prove difficult, if not
impossible, to contain within its originally anticipated boundaries. Propo-
nents of legalization usually begin with a wholesomely modest policy
agenda, limiting their suggested reforms to a narrow and highly specified
range of potential candidates and practices.2 7 "Give us PAS," they ask,
"not the more controversial practice of active euthanasia, for presently
competent patients who are terminally ill and suffering unbearable pain."
But the logic of the case for PAS, based as it is upon the twin pillars of
patient autonomy and mercy, makes it highly unlikely that society could
stop with this modest proposal once it had ventured out on the slope. As
numerous other critics have pointed out,28 if autonomy is the prime con-
sideration, then additional constraints based upon terminal illness or un-
bearable pain, or both, would appear hard to justify. Indeed, if autonomy
is crucial, the requirement of unbearable suffering would appear to be
entirely subjective. Who is to say, other than the patient herself, how
much suffering is too much? Likewise, the requirement of terminal ill-
ness seems an arbitrary standard against which to judge patients' own
subjective evaluation of their quality of life. If my life is no longer worth
living, why should a terminally ill cancer patient be granted PAS but not
me, merely because my suffering is due to my "non-terminal" Arterio
Lateral Sclerosis ("ALS") 29 or intractable psychiatric disorder?
Alternatively, if pain and suffering are deemed crucial to the justifica-
tion of legalization, it is hard to see how the proposed barrier of contem-
poraneous consent of competent patients could withstand serious erosion.
If the logic of PAS is at all similar to that of forgoing life-sustaining treat-,
ments, and we have every reason to think it so, then it would seem almost
inevitable that a case soon would be made to permit PAS for incompetent
patients who had left advance directives. That would then be followed by
a "substituted judgment" test for patients who "would have wanted"
PAS, and finally an "objective" test would be developed for patients (in-
cluding newborns) whose best interests would be served by PAS or active
27. See Christine Cassel et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1380-84 (1992) (approving of PAS
but not of active euthanasia because it poses excessive social risks).
28. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE: LIVING WITH MORTAL-
rry (1993). See also Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 739-53 (1995).
29. ALS also is known as Lou Gerhig's disease.
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euthanasia even in the absence of any subjective intent.30
In the same way, the joint justifications of autonomy and mercy com-
bine to undermine the plausibility of a line drawn between PAS and ac-
tive euthanasia. As the authors of one highly publicized proposal have
come to see, the logic of justification for active euthanasia is identical to
that of PAS. 31 Legalizing PAS, while continuing to ban active euthanasia,
would serve only to discriminate unfairly against patients who are suffer-
ing and wish to end their lives, but cannot do so because of some physical
impairment. Surely these patients, it will be said, are "the worst off
group," and therefore they are the most in need of the assistance of
others who will do for them what they can no longer accomplish on their
own.
None of these initial slippery slope considerations amount to knock-
down objections to further liberalization of our laws and practices. After
all, it is not obvious that each of these highly predictable shifts (e.g., from
terminal to "merely" incurable, from contemporaneous consent to best
interests, and from PAS to active euthanasia), are patently immoral and
unjustifiable. Still, in pointing out this likely slippage, the consequential-
ist opponents of PAS/euthanasia are calling on society to think about the
likely consequences of taking the first tentative step onto the slope. If all
of the extended practices predicted above pose substantially greater risks
for vulnerable patients than the more highly circumscribed initial liberali-
zation proposals, then we need to factor in these additional risks even as
we ponder the more modest proposals.
B. The Likelihood of Abuse
The second prong of the slippery slope argument argues that whatever
criteria for justifiable PAS and active euthanasia ultimately are chosen,
abuse of the system is highly likely to follow. In other words, patients
who fall outside the ambit of our justifiable criteria will soon be candi-
dates for death. This prong resembles what I have elsewhere called an
"empirical slope" 32 argument, as it is based not on the close logical re-
semblance of concepts or justifications, but rather on an empirical predic-
30. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (summarizing the logic of foregoing life-sus-
taining treatments).
31. See Cassel et al., supra note 27, at 1380-84. Cf. Miller et al., supra note 3, at 199-23
(conceding by the untenability of the previous distinction).
32. See John Arras, The Right to Die on the Slippery Slope, 8 Soc. THEORY & PRAC.
285 (1982) (describing the "slippery slope" argument in favor of PAS).
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tion of what is likely to happen when we insert a particular social practice
into our existing social system.
In order to reassure skeptics, the proponents of PAS/euthanasia concur
that any potentially justifiable social policy in this area must meet at least
the following three requirements.33 The policy would have to insist: first,
that all requests for death be truly voluntary; second, that all reasonable
alternatives to PAS and active euthanasia must be explored before acced-
ing to a patient's wishes; and, third, that a reliable system of reporting all
cases must be established in order to effectively monitor these practices
and respond to abuses. As a social pessimist on these matters, I worry,
given social reality as we know it, that all three assumptions are
problematic.
With regard to the voluntariness requirement, we pessimists contend
that many requests would not be sufficiently voluntary. In addition to the
subtly coercive influences of physicians and family members, perhaps the
most slippery aspect of this slope is the highly predictable failure of most
physicians to diagnose reliably and treat reversible clinical depression,
particularly in the elderly population. As one geriatric psychiatrist testi-
fied before the New York Task Force, we now live in the "golden age" of
treating depression, but the "lead age" of diagnosing it.34 We have the
tools, but physicians are not adequately trained and motivated to use
them. Unless dramatic changes are effected in the practice of medicine,
we can predict with confidence that many instances of PAS and active
euthanasia will constitute abuses of the original criterion of voluntariness.
Second, there is the lingering fear that any legislative proposal or judi-
cial mandate would have to be implemented within the present social sys-
tem marked by deep and pervasive discrimination against the poor and
members of minority groups.35 We have every reason to expect that a
policy that worked tolerably well in an affluent community like Scarsdale
or Beverly Hills, might not work so well in a community like Bedford-
33. See, e.g., Cassel et al., supra note 27; Miller et al., supra note 3; Charles H. Baron et
al., Statute: A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33
HARV. J. LEGIS. 1 (1996) (illustrating examples of proposals offered).
34. Dr. Gary Kennedy, Division of Geriatrics, Montefiore Medical Center-Albert
Einstein College of Medicine, Testimony before the New York Task Force on Life and the
Law (on file with author).
35. See New York Task Force, supra note 17, at 143 (illustrating discrimination against
minority groups). See also C.S. Cleeland et al., Pain and Its Treatment in Outpatients with
Metastic Cancer, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592, 592-96 (1994) (illustrating a study that found
that patients treated for cancer at centers that care predominantly for minority individuals
were three times more likely to receive inadequate therapy to relieve pain).
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Stuyvesant or Watts, where your average citizen has little or no access to
basic primary care, let alone sophisticated care for chronic pain at home
or in the hospital. There is also reason to worry about any policy of PAS
initiated within our growing system of managed care, capitation, and phy-
sician-incentives for delivering less care.36 Expert palliative care no
doubt is an expensive and time-consuming proposition, requiring more,
rather than less, time spent just talking with patients and providing them
with humane comfort. It is highly doubtful-that the context of physician-
patient conversation within this new dispensation of "turnstile medicine"
will be at all conducive to humane decisions untainted by subtle economic
coercion.
In addition, given the abysmal track record of physicians in responding
adequately to pain and suffering,37 we also can confidently predict that in
many cases all reasonable alternatives will not have been exhausted. In-
stead of vigorously addressing the pharmacological and psycho-social
needs of such patients, physicians no doubt will continue to ignore, un-
dertreat, or treat patients in an impersonal manner. The result will be
more depression, desperation, and requests for physician-assisted death
from patients who could have been successfully treated.38 The root
causes of this predictable lapse are manifold, but include such factors as
the inaccessibility of decent primary care to over thirty-seven million
Americans. Other notable causes are: an appalling lack of training in pal-
liative care even among primary care physicians and cancer specialists;39
discrimination in the delivery of pain control and other medical treat-
ments on the basis of race and economic status; various myths shared by
both physicians and patients about the supposed ill effects of pain medi-
36. See Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Context of Managed Care, 35
DUQUESNE L. REV. 455 (1996).
37. See New York Task Force, supra note 17, at 43-47. "Despite dramatic advances in
pain management, the deliveryof pain relief is grossly inadequate in clinical practice ....
Studies have shown that only 2 to 60 percent of cancer pain, is treated adequately." Id. at
43.
38. See Wolf, supra note 33.
39. See New York Task Force, supra note 17, at 44.
In general, researchers report that many doctors and nurses are poorly informed
about, and have limited experience with, pain and symptom management. Health
care professionals appear to have a limited understanding of the physiology of
pain and the pharmacology of narcotic analgesics. Accordingly, many lack the
understanding, skills, and confidence necessary for effective pain and symptom
management.
See also K.M. Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient Re-
quests for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMrT. 290 (1991).
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cations; and, restrictive state laws on access to opioids.40
Finally, with regard- to the third requirement, pessimists doubt that any
reporting system would adequately monitor these practices. A great deal
depends here on the extent to which patients and practitioners will regard
these practices as essentially private matters to be discussed and acted
upon-within the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship. As the Dutch
experience conclusively has demonstrated," physicians will be extremely
loath, to report instances -of PAS and active euthanasia to public authori-
ties, largely for fear of bringing the harsh glare of publicity upon the pa-
tients' families at a time when privacy is most needed. The likely result of
this predictable lack of oversight will be society's inability to respond ap-
propriately to disturbing incidents and long-term trends. In other words,
the practice most likely will not be as amenable to regulation as the pro-
ponents contend.
V. THREE APPROACHES TO SOCIAL POLICY
We come now to the difficult task of assessing the capacity of various
social policy approaches to address adequately all of the conflicting val-
ues implicated in this debate. This Article shall 'ontrast a forward-look-
ing, policy-oriented legislative approach to the backward-looking, case-
oriented judicial approach taken in the Compassion in Dying and Vacco
cases. Before coming to that comparison, however, a crucial preliminary
point must be noted. Central to any serious evaluation of competing pol-
icy approaches to PAS and euthanasia is the distinction between the mo-
rality of individual acts and the wisdom of social policy. Much of the
debate in the popular media is driven by the depiction of especially dra-
matic and poignant instances of suffering humanity, desperate for release
from the painful thrall of terminal illness.4 2 Understandably, many of us
are prompted to respond: "Should such a terrible fate ever befall me, I
certainly would not want to suffer interminably; I would want the option
40. See New York Task Force, supra note 17.
41. One source estimates that in the early 1990s, no more than 30% of cases of PAS
were reported. During 1994, the rate of reporting increased to roughly 50% of cases. See
John Keown, Further Reflections on Euthanasia in the Netherlands in the Light of the Rem-
melink Report and the Van Der Maas Survey, in EUTHANASIA: CLINICAL PRACTICE AND
THE LAW, 219, 235 (Luke Gormally ed., 1994); see also Daniel Callahan & Margot White,
The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30
U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1996).
42. See Tom Kuntz, Helping a Man Kill Himself, As Shown on Dutch TV, N. Y. TIMES
(Nov. 13, 1994), at E7 (describing the first national broadcast of an actual mercy killing in
the Netherlands).
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of an early exit and the help of my trusted physician in securing it." The
problem, however, lies in getting from such compelling individual cases to
social policy. The issue is not simply, "What would I want?," but rather,
what the best social policy is, all things considered. Social pessimists warn
that we cannot make this jump from individual case to policy without
endangering the autonomy and the very lives of others, many of whom
are numbered among our most vulnerable citizens.
A. A Judge-Made Policy Based on Constitutional Law
Appellate judges in the Ninth and Second Circuits have authored pow-
erful opinions giving constitutional protection to PAS for competent pa-
tients facing terminal illness. While these opinions fully vindicate
patients' important stake in having a freely chosen and pain free death,
they seriously and fatally discount the states' important interests in
preventing the kinds of slippage and abuse catalogued above.
1. Dismissal of Social Consequences
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit, Compassion in Dying, authored by
Judge Reinhardt,43 is particularly troubling with regard to the dismissal of
social consequences. In response to the objection that legalizing PAS in-
evitably will prove "infinitely expansive," the court acknowledges the dif-
ficulty that it may be hard to distinguish the moral logic of PAS from that
animating the call for direct physician-administered euthanasia. He fur-
ther concedes that in some cases, patients will need the help of a physi-
cian in carrying out their choice of an autonomous and painless death."
Instead of carefully weighing this sobering possibility in the balance, or
asking whether this likelihood of slippage should make us hesitate in tak-
ing the first step onto the slope, the court immediately dismisses it as a
problem for future cases, not this one, noting that, "here we decide only
the issue before us."45 For those who worry that direct euthanasia carried
out by physicians might impose too great a risk in the current social cli-
mate,46 the dictum will prove less than comforting, for in effect he is say-
ing that "it [is] less important who administers the medication than who
determines whether the terminally ill person's life shall end."4
43. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 830-32 (9th Cir. 1996).
44. Id. at 831.
45. Id. at 832.
46. This group once included such distinguished physicians and advocates of PAS as
Dr. Timothy Quill, Christine Cassel, and Diane Meier. See Cassel et al., supra note 27.
47. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832.
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Thus, although we have argued that this kind of forward-looking, pol-
icy-oriented perspective is crucial for adequately assessing the individual
benefits and social risks involved in the proposal to legalize PAS, the judi-
cial approach to the problem operates fully equipped with social blinders,
and willfully dismisses the very real dangers lurking further down the
slope, all in the name of individual rights. Indeed, at one point Judge
Reinhardt implies that a refusal to contemplate such dangers is de-
manded by the judicial role itself.48 To put it mildly and most charitably,
this rights-orientated mind-set does not put us in a learning mode! When
life and death are at stake, we need to base our social policy on a more
comprehensive picture of the likely benefits and risks.
Judge Reinhardt's grasp of the clinical realities of depression and the
ubiquitous absence of adequate pain control is no more impressive than
the scope of his social vision. In response to the objection that the legali-
zation of PAS eventually would lead physicians to treat requests to die in
a routine and impersonal manner, Judge Reinhardt reassures us, in the
face of massive evidence to the contrary, that "doctors would not assist a
terminally ill patient to hasten his death as long as there were any reason-
able chance of alleviating the patient's suffering or enabling him to live
under tolerable conditions."49 Judge Reinhardt's faith in professional
and governmental regulations to ensure that all requests truly are volun-
tary (i.e., not due to depression), and free from the taint of untreated pain
and suffering, is perhaps refreshing in the age of governmental regula-
tion-bashing, but it is a naive and dangerous faith all the same.
2. Equal Protection and the Fate of Responsible Regulation
The ability of a constitutional right to assisted suicide to provide ade-
quately for safeguards against abuse, neglect, and mistake is especially
problematic within the context of the Second Circuit's equal protection
analysis in Vacco. The court's assertion of the moral and legal equiva-
lence of withholding life-sustaining treatments, the provision of poten-
tially death-hastening analgesics, and assisted suicide5" raises extremely
troubling questions about the constitutionality of a wide variety of possi-
bly effective regulations. The basic question is: If we have a constitution-
48. Id. at 831 ("In fact, the Court has never refused to recognize a substantive due
process liberty right or interest merely because there were difficulties in determining when
and how to limit its exercise or because others might someday attempt to use it
improperly.").
49. Id. at 827.
50. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2nd Cir. 1996).
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ally protected liberty interest in determining the time and manner of our
deaths, then to what extent will various regulatory schemes cut too
deeply into our personal choices?
We actually have seen this script played out before in the context of
abortion law. Prior to Roe v. Wade,5 many states already had begun lib-
eralizing their statutes to allow women to opt for abortion under specified
conditions. One regulatory constraint that had been placed on women's
choice in some jurisdictions was mandatory review by a hospital-based
committee. 2 Now, whether or not we think that such committee review
was a good idea in the context of abortion, it is interesting to note that
this regulatory mechanism, along with a host of others, was discarded un-
ceremoniously by the Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton,53 the companion
case to Roe v. Wade.54 In sum, the Court held that such mechanisms only
serve to encumber the woman's choice, which really belongs to her (and
perhaps also her doctor) alone.55
Now, if the Second Circuit's equal protection analysis prevails and
courts come to see no cognizable legal or moral differences between "al-
lowing to die" and assisted suicide, then presumably the regulatory mech-
anisms surrounding the two sets of practices will have to be more or less
congruent.56 This kind of legally-mandated parity will have two likely
consequences. First, all the paraphernalia of surrogate decision-making
that currently surrounds decisions to forgo treatment would have to be
extended to PAS.5 7 Just as we presently allow family or close friends to
make life and death decisions for loved ones58 on the basis of so-called
"substituted judgment" ("What would the patient have wanted?") or best
interests determinations, so we would have to allow family members the
same role in those cases in which suicide "would have been chosen" by
the patient or "would have been" in his best interest. Obviously, this
implication of the equal protection approach would require proponents
51. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184 (1973).
53. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
54. Id. at 198.
55. Id.
56. Frank G. Miller, Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide by Judicial Decision: A Crit-
ical Appraisal, 2 BIOLAW S-136, S-143 (Jul.-Aug. 1996) (This is the theme of Frank Miller's
thoughtful and cogent critique of the circuit court opinions.).
57. Id. at S-143.
58. For a comprehensive account of practices and laws governing the forgoing of life-
sustaining treatment and surrogate decision making, see ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE
(2d ed. 1995).
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of PAS to bite a very large bullet regarding the charge of infinite
expansion,
The second implication of the equal protection analysis is that a broad
range of possibly helpful regulatory mechanisms, including waiting peri-
ods, committee review, second opinions, mandatory reporting, and per-
haps even the requirement of terminal illness, might well be swept aside
in the name of individual liberty.59 Currently,.we do not require these
kinds of substantive and procedural constraints for most decisions to
forgo life-sustaining treatments by competent, terminally ill patients.6" If,
however, there is really no moral or legal difference between "allowing to
die" and "assisting suicide" -if, as Judge Miner opines, adding PAS to
our repertoire of choices would not add one iota of additional risk to
individuals or society over and above those we already countenance-
then encumbering the choice for PAS with all sorts of extra protective
devices would seemingly lack constitutional validity.61 In sum, then, the
equal protection analysis currently regnant in the Second Circuit threat-
ens precisely those braking mechanisms that arguably would make the
slippery slope a safer place on which to practice physician-assisted death.
3. The Conflation of Killing and Allowing to Die
Proceeding directly to the fulcrum of Judge Miner's analysis; we now
consider the denial of a significant moral or legal difference between al-
lowing a patient to die by means of forgoing life-sustaining treatments
and assisting a patient in committing suicide. According to both circuit
court opinions, there is not a significant difference between withdrawing a
ventilator, discontinuing a feeding tube, administering pain-killing but
(potentially) life-shortening opioids, and prescribing a lethal dose of bar-
biturates.6" In all these cases, the judges allege, the intention is the same
(i.e., to hasten death), the cause of death is the same (an act attributable
to human agency), and the social risks of mistake and abuse are the same
(e.g., misdiagnosis, undue pressure, etc.). Consequently, Judge Reinhardt
concludes that PAS poses no greater threat than forgoing treatment to
the state's interests in preventing suicide and in safeguarding the integrity
of the medical profession,63 and Judge Miner sees no point in a more
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2nd Cir. 1996); see also Compassion in Dying
v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 822-24 (9th Cir. 1996).
63. Miller, supra note 56, at S-139.
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restrictive public policy towards PAS.' This Article argues against this
conflation of forgoing treatment and assisting suicide. Although the
boundaries between these two practices at times are admittedly quite
fuzzy, 65 this Article contends that the failure to attend to relevant differ-
ences contributes to their failure to discern the very real social risks in-
herent in their judicial approaches to policy.
First, some concessions. As Judges Miner and Reinhardt and numer-
ous commentators have pointed out, it is sometimes difficult to discern
any meaningful differences between forgoing life-sustaining treatments
and what happens in PAS.66 If one focuses on the physician's intent as
marking a crucial difference, the problem arises that often physicians
have mixed intentions.67 In the act of discontinuing a life-sustaining ven-
tilator, for example, some physicians actually intend not just to rid the
patient of unwelcome technology, but to help the patient end her suffer-
ing by dying sooner. That is, they intend the patient's earlier death, and
no one views this as especially problematic so long as the other conditions
for acceptable termination of treatment are in place.
The same is true for cases involving the administration of potentially
life-shortening opioids. While many physicians and nurses intend merely
to alleviate the patient's pain, even at some risk of shortening life, it is no
doubt true that others participating in such decisions actually intend or
welcome the patient's earlier death. In spite of the fact that such inten-
tions may be operative, we do not abandon the practice of administering
adequate amounts of opioids. Even with these intentions in mind, we do
not abandon the practice. 68 Likewise, if one stresses a difference in cau-
sation, i.e., claiming that in the one case the cause of death is the patient's
underlying disease, while in PAS and euthanasia the cause is the physi-
cian's direct or indirect action, it often is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that whatever causation we might attribute to an underlying disease in
determining whether a patient will die, it remains true that human actors
still are responsible for deciding when and how the patient dies. When a
doctor detaches a feeding tube from a patient who could have lived for an
64. Id. at S-140.
65. Dan Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 10, 10 (1992).
66. For the best exposition of this position, see id.
67. Timothy Quill, The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1039,
1039-40 (1992).
68. See R.A. MCCORMICK, AMBIGUITY IN MORAL CHOICES (1973); T.L. BEAUCHAMP
& J.F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (4th ed. 1994); B.A. Brody, A His-
torical Introduction to Jewish Casuistry on Suicide and Euthanasia, in SUICIDE AND EUTHA-
NASIA 73 (B.A. Brody ed., 1989).
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additional decade, albeit in a profoundly diminished state, she certainly is
"the cause" of death insofar as she determines when and how the patient
dies.
All of this can be granted without conceding the judges' claim that
there are no significant differences between these practices. With regard
to the administration of opiates, a doctor can still argue for their aggres-
sive deployment even if there is no intention whatsoever of shortening
the patient's life. Just as a surgeon might undertake risky heart surgery
knowing that the patient may die on the table, so the conscientious physi-
cian can risk suppressing the patient's respiratory drive and thus hasten
death so long as she is pursuing a valid medical objective and there are no
better options.69
Similarly, a physician who withdraws a ventilator from a dying patient
can do so without intending the patient's premature death. Such an act
can be entirely justified either on the ground that the patient is rejecting
this bodily encroachment or that the treatment no longer is proportion-
ately beneficial. As for the rebuttal to the standard causation analysis,
the fact that the physician somehow is causally responsible for the pa-
tient's death does not make the physician morally responsible in exactly
the same manner as she would have been had she administered or pre-
scribed a fatal dose.7" Indeed, even in the case of detaching a feeding
tube from a non-terminally ill patient, arguably the case where the dis-
tinction between allowing to die and killing is fuzziest, one can still main-
tain that "the cause" of death (or at least the most important cause for
purposes of moral accountability) remains the patient's underlying medi-
cal condition, which includes the inability to eat or swallow, just as the
cause of the ventilator-dependent patient's death is that patient's inability
to spontaneously breathe.
Whatever the outcome of such conceptual skirmishes71 bearing on the
69. In view of the manifest resistance of most physicians to participate in acts of as-
sisted suicide or direct killing, the attempts of Judges Reinhardt and Miner to conflate the
provision of adequate pain control with assisted suicide or euthanasia constitutes, in my
opinion, a reckless, ill-informed, and counterproductive gesture: ill-informed because both
judges seem to assume that adequate doses of such opioids invariably will shorten life,
whereas the truth is that the expert administration of such drugs usually will not have this
effect; reckless and counterproductive because many physicians would sooner give up their
allegiance to adequate pain control than their opposition to assisted suicide and euthana-
sia. If they are convinced by the judges reasoning, many will be reluctant to practice ade-
quate pain control techniques on their dying patients. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 833 (9th Cir. 1996).
70. See CALLAHAN, supra note 28, at 76-82.
71. For a helpful review of the arguments surrounding the distinction between "letting
19971
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"intrinsic" distinctions between PAS, direct euthanasia, and forgoing life-
sustaining treatments, the crucial question remains whether any of the
purported distinctions between these activities constitute important dif-
ferences for purposes of social policy. As a slippery slope opponent of
PAS and euthanasia, I have already conceded that individual acts involv-
ing either PAS or active euthanasia can be morally justified under certain
circumstances. Having thus conceded that certain individual actions can
be morally appropriate even when the intent is simply and unambigu-
ously to end the patient's life, and even when "the cause" of death is
simply and unambiguously attributable to the action of the physician, the
crucial question is whether there are any remaining distinctions between
allowing to die and actively killing (or assisting in a suicide) that might
illuminate the negative policy implications of PAS and euthanasia.
Two points can be made in this connection. First, as the New York
Task Force pointed out, the social consequences of not honoring requests
to forgo treatment are very different from the consequences of failing to
honor requests for PAS and euthanasia.72 When society fails to honor
requests to prescribe or deliver a lethal dose, the results can be onerous
for individual patients. The patient may face a prolonged period of dete-
rioration before death, with increased pain and decreased dignity, con-
trary to what they otherwise would have wished. It is important to note,
however, that in many such cases there are alternatives to prolonged and
painful deaths. Under the present legal regime it is still permissible for a
patient to seek out effective and compassionate hospice care, to refuse
further administration of life-sustaining treatments, and even to starve to
death with the aid of a physician.73 It is also legal for an individual truly
to take matters into his own hands and to kill himself, perhaps with the
aid of a popular "self-help" book on the matter.74 Finally, it is possible
for many patients with a good and trusting relationship with a compas-
sionate physician to achieve their objective within the bounds of a private
and discreet relationship, but without the cover and consolations of law.75
die" and PAS/euthanasia, see Kamisar, supra note 28, at 753-60. For those wishing to go
deeper into these troubled waters, see KILLING AND LETTING DIE (Bonnie Steinbock &
Alastair Norcross eds., 1995). See also INTENDING DEATH: THE ETHICS OF ASSISTED SUI-
CIDE AND EUTHANASIA (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., 1996).
72. See New York Task Force, supra note 17, at 146-47.
73. See David M. Eddy, A Conversation with My Mother, 272 JAMA 179 (1994) (illus-
trating the possibility of death by starvation).
74. See DAVID HUMPHREY, FINAL Exrr: THE PRACICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANCE
AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991) (describing methods of suicide).
75. See Dick Lehr, Death and the Doctor's Hand: Increasingly, Secretly, Doctors Are
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By contrast, were society, systematically and as a matter of policy, to
refuse to honor requests to forgo life-sustaining treatments, then every-
one would have to submit to the imposition of unwanted and often inva-
sive measures. Whereas the refusal to honor a request for PAS or direct
euthanasia amounts to a refusal of a positive benefit or assistance, the
imposition of medical treatment against one's will represents a violation
of personal autonomy and physical integrity totally incompatible with 'the
deepest meaning of our traditional respect for liberty. Such a refusal
would entail the virtual imprisonment of the entire population of termi-
nally ill and dying patients. While the failure to offer a deadly drug to a
dying patient represents a failure of mercy requiring moral justification,
the forced imposition of medical treatment against a patient's will argua-
bly constitutes a trespass, or technically a legal battery,76 so profound that
it simply cannot be justified, especially at the level of broad-gauged social
policy.
Without trying to be especially hyperbolical, we can say that the prac-
tice of forgoing treatment is by now so deeply embedded in our social and
medical practices that a reversal of policy on this point would throw most
of our major medical institutions into a state approaching chaos. The
same cannot be said of a refusal to honor requests for PAS and euthana-
sia. Thus, while there may well be many overlapping similarities between
withholding treatment and participating in PAS or euthanasia, their re-
spective denial at the level of social policy would entail vastly different
individual and social consequences.
The second point in this connection is that the practice of PAS and/or
active euthanasia would be bound to implicate many more persons than
the practice of forgoing treatment." While we should definitely worry
about the possibility of error, neglect, and abuse in the context of al-
lowing patients to die, it is at least somewhat comforting to realize that
just about every patient in this category must be very bad off indeed. By
the time that physicians resort to discussing forgoing treatment with a
patient or family, the patient usually will be well along in the process of
dying.
With regard to PAS and euthanasia, however, we can expect that many
candidates will be perfectly ambulatory and far from the dreaded scene of
Helping the Incurably Ill to Die, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 25, 1993), at 1 (featuring the experi-
ence of physicians who have helped patients to commit suicide).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (defining battery).
77. See also Seth Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian?: An Essay on Roe,
Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803, 841 (1995).
1997]
382 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:361
painful terminal illness depicted by advocates. Depending on how great
the social slippage, this category may well come to encompass "merely"
those with an incurable condition but who are not presently "terminal,"
such as persons in the early stages of HIV infection or Alzheimer dis-
ease.78 It also may come to encompass patients suffering from prolonged
and intractable depression who exhibit no other symptoms of physical
illness. While one important legislative proposal specifically excludes pa-
tients whose only symptoms are psychiatric in nature,79 this reluctance
was likely motivated in no small measure by political considerations.8"
Once PAS or active euthanasia, or both, are firmly in place, however, it
will be extremely difficult to withhold them from persons whose suffering
is every bit as real but whose source is entirely psychological rather than
physical. That, Judge Miner and many others will surely object, consti-
tutes an invidious distinction and thus a form of unconstitutional discrimi-
nation against the mentally ill.
The point, then, is that a policy that countenances only allowing pa-
tients to die will encompass fewer categories of people; thus it will pres-
ent fewer possibilities for mistake and abuse than a policy that also
encompasses a right to PAS or active euthanasia. In addition, by refusing
to extend explicit legal sanction to any PAS or euthanasia, such a cautious
policy would be much better equipped to prevent highly predictable slip-
page in the direction of such questionable categories of patients as the
chronically depressed or those who do not wish to wait for the predict-
able symptoms of their illness to emerge before killing themselves.
78. The prospects for slippage here are excellent. The step from a requirement of
terminal illness, viewed by these courts as canonical, to one of merely "untreatable" or
"incurable" illness, already has been recommended by a panel of distinguished proponents
of PAS. See Miller et al., supra note 3. It is interesting to note in this connection that one
of Jack Kevorkian's earliest "patients," Janet Atkins, reportedly was playing tennis a week
or two before her assisted suicide.
79. Baron et al., supra note 33, at 11. At an American Philosophical Association sym-
posium on PAS in December, 1995, Professor Brock conceded that politics played a signif-
icant role in his group's decision not to sanction PAS for the chronically mentally ill.
80. Appeals to legalize PAS draw much of their popularity from advocates' assurances
that the class of permissible cases will be tightly circumscribed. Endorsing the claims of
those who are not terminally ill but suffering from severe psychological distress would no
doubt reinforce the public's fears of the slippery slope and thereby erode public support
for legalizing PAS. It thus makes good strategic sense for the advocates of PAS to defer
approval of suicide for purely psychiatric indications until after the initial battle for legali-
zation has been won. Once the goal of legalization is accomplished, it will be easier politi-
cally to take this additional step-a conclusion to which both the advocates of PAS and its
slippery slope opponents can agree.
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B. If the States are the Laboratory, What's the Experiment?
Although the Ninth Circuit is prepared to grant that states have a legit-
imate interest in avoiding the possibly adverse social consequences of
PAS, the court insists that regulation, rather than prohibition, is the only
constitutionally permissible means of so doing."1 Toward that end, it
would assign the challenging task of crafting appropriate regulations to
the "laboratory of the states." In view of the very real possibility that the
social and individual harms attendant upon the legalization of PAS even-
tually would prove disproportionate to their benefits, this division of la-
bor between the judiciary and the state legislatures is highly problematic.
Were the Supreme Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in grant-
ing constitutional protection to the liberty interest in choosing death, then
in effect, there would be no turning back, short of a constitutional amend-
ment. Even if a number of the predicted bad social consequences were to
materialize, such that we faced a vastly expanded right coupled with
widespread abuse and neglect, the judicial response would not be to re-
voke constitutional protection; rather, the judges would merely rebuke
the states for not doing their job of regulation.
Instead of putting ourselves into this precarious position, we should
assign a different and more fundamental task to the laboratory of the
states. Given the very real possibilities for extension and abuse of this
liberty interest, state legislatures should be entrusted with the basic ques-
tions of whether, when, and under what circumstances such a risky social
experiment should be attempted in the first place. As these Circuit Court
decisions amply demonstrate, state legislatures are in a better position
than federal judges to study the social and clinical facts and come to a
reasonable conclusion on the likely balance of individual benefit and so-
cial risks.82 Given the social and medical realities of this country, I would
hope that most states would follow the lead of the New York Task Force
in refusing to countenance the legalization and routinization of PAS at
this time. However, even if some states do decide to run these risks as a
social experiment, i.e., to determine empirically for themselves whether
more good than harm will come from legalizing PAS, they would have the
flexibility, absent rigidly defined constitutional mandates, both to impose
very strict regulations and, if necessary, to stop the experiment cold in the
81. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 832-33, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1996).
82. See Carl E. Schneider, Making Sausage: The Ninth Circuit's Opinion, 27 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 27-28 (1997) (reviewing the shortcomings of judges in coming to terms with
the complexities of highly contextualized social problems such as PAS).
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face of disconcerting evidence of serious moral slippage. Not only is this
legislative approach more democratic, it also is much better suited to ask-
ing the relevant policy questions and taking (and possibly revoking) ap-
propriate and prudent action.8 3
C. A Legislative Alternative
The type of legislative proposal outlined above has been made recently
by John Fletcher and colleagues.' Eschewing any and all court-man-
dated solutions, these proponents offer a daring but carefully hedged plan
to legalize PAS within a framework that conceives of it as a last-ditch
effort to address the pain and suffering of incurably ill or dying patients.
First, the authors concede two important points that some of them had
denied in a previous proposal for legalizing and regulating PAS. In that
earlier essay, Timothy Quill and Diane Meier had argued on traditional
grounds of autonomy and mercy that PAS should be allowed, but not
active euthanasia by physicians. They claimed that a moral and practical
distinction could be drawn between PAS and euthanasia on the grounds
of the latter's (but not the former's) threat to vulnerable patients in a
society so flawed by social injustice. Quill and Meier also had attempted
to distinguish cases involving terminal illness, for which they felt PAS was
appropriate, from those involving patients whose conditions were
"merely" incurable, in which they felt PAS was not appropriate. In their
most recent policy recommendation, (co-authored with professors
Fletcher, Miller, and Brody), Quill and Meier conceded that these two
distinctions cannot be logically or practically maintained. They now ad-
mit that allowing PAS effectively commits us to permitting active eutha-
nasia, especially for that most vulnerable class of patients who are too
weak and disabled to kill themselves. They also conceded that both au-
tonomy and mercy justify extending the practices of PAS and euthanasia
to encompass those who are merely incurable but not terminally ill.
Whether or not one agrees with their reformulated position, these au-
thors should at least be commended for forthrightly admitting what is at
stake in this debate.
83. For similar reasons, I am highly skeptical of state ballot initiatives, such as the 1994
initiative in Oregon, which do not make use of the legislatures' superior fact-finding capa-
bilities. Legislatures are not restricted, as the courts are, to the individual case; they can
adopt a more comprehensive vision that encompasses a wide spectrum of individual and
social risks and benefits. Should a particularly disturbing trend materialize, a legislature
could put an end to the social experiment or suspend it until appropriate remedies are
deployed.
84. Miller et al., supra note 3, at 120.
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Second, the authors propose an additional safeguard designed to ad-
dress most of our "empirical slope" objections: a requirement of in-
dependent and impartial oversight by a certified palliative-care
consultant within a national network of palliative-care committees.85
Before any choice for death arrived at by patient and physician could be
sanctioned within this proposed system, a certified consultant would have
to review the physician's diagnosis, the patient's prognosis, the possibility
of available but untried alternatives for palliative care, and the voluntary
nature and strength of the patient's wish to die, etcetera. All consultants
presumably would be well versed in the techniques of palliative care, the
nuances of competency determinations, bioethics and law, and the reali-
ties of life for dying patients. Should a patient, physician, or both, disa-
gree with the verdict of a consultant, they could appeal the case to the
consultant's regional committee.
This part of the proposal marks a significant improvement over many
past proposals and legislative ballot initiatives.86 The requirements that
voluntariness and competency be verified by a skilled diagnostician/clini-
cian, and that either PAS or active euthanasia be permitted only after the
failure of all other reasonable alternatives, would both go a long way to-
ward providing serious safeguards and assuaging the Task Force's fears of
an unalterably slippery slope. I, however, have reservations.
First, there is the lingering fear expressed throughout the Task Force's
report that any legislative proposal would have to be implemented within
the present context of deep and pervasive discrimination against the poor
and members of minority groups.8 7
Second, it must be noted that the impressive safeguards required by
this proposal would entail significant costs, not only in purely monetary
terms, but also with regard to privacy and autonomy for both patients and
physicians. Even though the authors deny that their proposal is based
upon a right to PAS, which itself would be based upon the right to privacy
in the same manner as abortion,8 they will have a hard time explaining
85. Id. at 119 (describing the basic plan on palliative care).
86. Washington State Initiatives 119 (1991); Doron Weber, A Way Around Kevorkian,
USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 1993), at 13A (reporting the defeat of a California ballot initiative to
permit PAS by a vote of 54-46); Oregon Death With Dignity Act (1995). See also George
J. Annas, Death by Prescription-The Oregon Initiative,. 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1240
(1994).
87. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
88. See DWORKIN, supra note 15 (providing an elegant and powerful restatement of
the view that in a pluralistic society individuals should have rights against governmental
interference with deeply personal "private choices," such as abortion and euthanasia).
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this to patients whose appeals have been rejected by the palliative-care
consultant and committee. Just as the elaborate paraphernalia of com-
mittee review of abortion decisions was swept aside by autonomy-driven
judicial decisions in Roe v. Wade89 and Doe v. Bolton,90 so here patients
imbued with the rhetoric of autonomy will surely ask, "Who do these so-
called 'consultants' and 'God-committees' think they are, passing judg-
ment on the quality of my own personal suffering?"
Physicians and patients surely will be highly offended by the implica-
tion that they cannot be trusted to handle these matters in a competent
and sensitive way within the privacy of the physician-patient relationship,
without a new layer of intrusive and expensive bureaucracy. Indeed, to
my mind, the biggest problem for the proponents of this plan would
come, not from opponents of PAS on slippery slope grounds, but rather
from patients and physicians eager to cast off all remaining vestiges of
state-sponsored bureaucracy. In short, the proposed regulations are plau-
sible, at least in theory; but whether they could be sold to skeptical legis-
latures, physicians, and patients' rights groups is a different and much
more difficult question.
D. A Policy of Prudent (Legal) Restraint and Aggressive
(Medical) Intervention
In contrast to the judicial approach, which totally vindicates the value
of patient autonomy at the expense of protecting the vulnerable, and in
contrast to the Fletcher, Miller, et al. proposal which assumes (errone-
ously, I believe) that we simultaneously can pursue both goals without
incurring undue social costs; my own preferred approach to a social policy
of PAS and euthanasia conceives of this debate as posing essentially a
"tragic choice." 91 It frankly acknowledges that whatever choice we make,
whether we opt for a reaffirmation of the current legal restraints or for a
policy of legitimation and regulation, there are bound to be "victims."
The victims of the current policy are easy to identify: they are on the
news, the talk shows, the documentaries, and often on Dr. Kevorkian's
roster of so-called "patients." The victims of legalization, by contrast, will
be largely hidden from view; they will include the clinically depressed
eighty-year-old man who could have lived for another year of good qual-
ity if only he had been adequately treated, and the fifty-year-old woman
89. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
91. For an explication of the notion of a "tragic choice" in the sense that I employ
here, see GuIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
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who asks for death because doctors in her financially stretched HMO
cannot, or will not, effectively treat her unrelenting, but mysterious, pel-
vic pain. Perhaps eventually, if we slide far enough down the slope, the
uncommunicative stroke victim, whose distant children deem an earlier
death to be a better death, will fall victim. There will be others besides
these, many coming from the ranks of the uninsured and the poor. To the
extent that minorities and the poor already suffer from the effects of dis-
crimination in our health care system, it is reasonable to expect that any
system of PAS and euthanasia will exhibit similar effects, such as failure
to access adequate primary care, pain management, and psychiatric diag-
nosis and treatment. Unlike Dr. Kevorkian's "patients," these victims
will not get their pictures in the papers, but they all will have faces and
they will all be cheated of good months or perhaps even years.
This "tragic choice" approach to social policy on PAS/euthanasia takes
the form of the following argument, with four basic steps. First, the
number of "genuine cases" justifying PAS, active euthanasia, or both, will
be relatively small. Patients who receive good personal care, good pain
relief, treatment for depression, and adequate psycho-social supports
tend not to persist in their desire to die.
Second, the social risks of legalization are serious and highly predict-
able. They include the expansion of these practices to nonvoluntary
cases, the advent of active euthanasia, and the widespread failure to pur-
sue readily available alternatives to suicide motivated by pain, depres-
sion, lack of access to good medical care, and hopelessness.
Third, rather than propose a momentous and dangerous policy shift for
a relatively small number of "genuine cases" -a shift that would surely
involve a great deal of persistent social division and strife analogous to
that involved in the abortion controversy-we should instead attempt to
redirect the public debate toward a goal on which we can and should all
agree, namely the manifest and urgent need to reform the way we die in
America. Instead of launching a highly divisive and dangerous campaign
for PAS, we should attack the problem at its root with an ambitious pro-
gram of reform in the areas of access to primary care and the education
of physicians in palliative care. At least as far as the "slippery slope"
opponents of PAS and euthanasia are concerned, we should thus first see
to it that the vast majority of people in this country have access to ade-
quate, affordable, and nondiscriminatory, primary and palliative care. At
the end of this long and arduous process, when we finally have an equita-
ble, effective, and compassionate health care system in place, one that
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might be compared favorably with that in the Netherlands, then we might
well want to reopen the discussion of PAS and active euthanasia.
Finally, there are those few unfortunate patients who truly are beyond
the pale of good palliative, hospice, and psychiatric care. The opponents
of legalization can take limited solace from the fact that many such pa-
tients still will be able to find compassionate physicians who, like Dr.
Timothy Quill, will ultimately be willing, albeit in fear and trembling, to
"take small risks for people [they] really know and care about."9 Such
actions will continue to take place within the privacy of the patient-physi-
cian relationship, however, and thus will not threaten vulnerable patients
and the social fabric to the same extent as would result from full legaliza-
tion and regulation.
To be sure, this kind of continuing covert PAS unfortunately will not be
subject to regulation, but the threat of possible criminal sanctions and
revocation of licensure will continue to serve, for the majority of physi-
cians, as powerful disincentives to abuse the system. Moreover, as sug-
gested earlier, it is highly unlikely that the proposals for legalization
would result in truly effective oversight.
VI. CONCLUSION
Instead of conceiving this momentous debate as a choice between, on
the one hand, legalization and regulation with all of their attendant risks,
and on the other hand, the callous abandonment of patients to their pain
and suffering, 93 enlightened opponents must recommend a positive pro-
gram of clinical and social reforms. On the clinical level, physicians must
learn how to really listen to their patients, to unflinchingly engage them
in sensitive discussions of their needs and the meaning of their requests
for assisted death, to deliver appropriate palliative care, to distinguish
fact from fiction in the ethics and law of pain relief, to diagnose and treat
clinical depression, and finally, to ascertain and respect their patients'
wishes for control regarding the forgoing of life-sustaining treatments.
On the social level, opponents of PAS must aggressively promote major
initiatives in medical and public education regarding pain control, in the
sensitization of insurance companies and licensing agencies to issues of
the quality of dying, and in the reform of state laws that currently hinder
92. Timothy Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 691, 694 (1991).
93. In framing the question in just this way, Ronald Dworkin is guilty of posing a false
dilemma in his otherwise admirable book. See DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 198.
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access to pain relieving medications.94
In the absence of an ambitious effort in the direction of aggressive
medical and social reform, I fear that the medical and nursing professions
will have'lost whatever moral warrant and credibility they might still have
in continuing to oppose physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia.
As soon as these reforms are in place, however, we might then wish to
proceed slowly and cautiously with experiments in various states to test
the overall benefits of a policy of legalization. Until that time, however,
we are not well served as a society by court decisions allowing for legali-
zation of PAS. I hope and trust that the Supreme Court will strike them
down. Finally, I hope that continued sober reflection on the likely conse-
quences of PAS and euthanasia will prompt John Fletcher to revive his
earlier well-founded skepticism regarding the current social risks of these
practices.
94. This brief sketch of suggested reforms merely summarizes the careful work of. the
New York Task Force. See New York Task Force, supra note 17.
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